Temat: The Consequences of Vietnam

The United States was not invincible anymore. Its foreign policy had to adjust to the fact.
The US lacked confidence in its idealism. But most of all the military did not want to be engaged in anything like Vietnam in the future. The Vietnam trauma resulted in a new foreign policy and military doctrine known as the Weinberger doctrine from 1984. It objected sending US forces into a conflict unless six criteria were met:
1. the war was vital for US or alliance interests,
2. it was to be fought “wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning,”
3. objectives were to be clearly defined,
4. reassessments of the commitment were constantly to be made,
5. popular and congressional support of the commitment were reasonably certain, and
6. use of arms was the last resort to protect US interests.
The Weinberger doctrine was contested by Secretary of State George Shultz, who claimed that “diplomacy not backed by military strength is ineffectual.” The conflict between the Defense and State Departments lasted until 1987, when Weinberger resigned. Ironically, his doctrine survived and was adapted by Colin Powell in the Gulf War of 1991.
Reagan’s doctrine of 1985 went even further. The US should avoid direct engagement, which are costly and risky, and instead should support “freedom fighters” all over the world, to help them to fight communism. No large forces needed. No risk of Vietnam II. Financial aide, combined with CIA covert aide, was to be a new strategy. Intervention in Grenada in 1983 was just a symbolic one that was to show the Soviets the US is strong and ready to intervene, but there was no risk.