Temat: Paper: Tienanmen Square Incident and US-China relations...

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the events in Tienanmen Square in 1989 and draw a conclusion about the possible consequences of those events on the relations with the U.S.A. throughout the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. In order to succeed in my task, I will use various sources ranging from general books on U.S. history to those specific on the U.S.-China relations. I will also analyze the articles in Foreign Affairs as a rich source on the relations. I will also have a look at certain articles in various magazines, including Time, Newsweek or the Financial Timest. In my project firstly I want to focus on the consequences of those events on the relations with the U.S.A., if there were any. What is more, I intend to focus on the relationship from three perspectives: economy, human rights and national security as these features are very characteristic of Sino-American relations. My paper touches upon a little broader theme than just the immediate consequences of those events. That is why the title of my paper is Tienanmen Square Incident and U.S.-China relations in 1990s, and not the influence of it on the period. At the very end of my paper I decided to devote some time to the question of Taiwan as I consider it an acutely important issue in trying to understand U.S.-China relations in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century.
China is the most populous country in the world (over 1.3 billion of people) and due to the fact it is a very important actor on the international arena, both from the perspective of trade and economy as well as politics. What is more, the country is as well under the regime of Communists, which makes it quite a difficult partner, especially for Americans. They, however, cannot afford to have the country as the enemy as such a huge and powerful foe would be no good for the U.S.A.

Tienanmem Square
As far as the events in Tienanmen Square are concerned, Henry Kissinger, in his Does America Need a Foreign Policy, gives a number of reasons for the events of 1989. He states that:
The events in Tienanmen Square had been more complex than a simple anti-Communist
revolt, having at least three causes: the revolt of students based on Western principles of
democracy; workers rebelling to remove, or at least to alleviate, the inequities, abuses, and
dislocations generated by economic reform; and the internal struggle within the
Communist Party largely about the political consequences of the reform of the economy.

In the field of economy, the sudden burst of inflation was one of the reasons for the unrest. Tyler calls the level of inflation “devastating.” Melinda Liu states that economic liberalization introduced by Deng triggered the pro-democracy protests in Tienanmen. She calls the liberalization “Deng’s next great experiment.” We can conclude here that the liberalization, about which I will write more later in my paper, was not thoroughly verified before its implementation in 1979.
On June 4, 1989, Chinese military were ordered to put down the pro-democracy protesters, the majority of them were students, in Tienanmen Square, Beijing. Hundreds of the students got killed (according to various sources from 500 to 2000 people) and thousands of them were taken to jail. President Bush, not expecting what would happen, was pleased by the demonstration as typically American symbols were present there- the students built a minature of the Statue of Liberty, which meant that they were inspired by American ideals.
President Bush’s response was immediate. Myers and Shambaugh notice that the question of Sino-American relations was ‘high priority’ issue for Bush. They also add that the president considered the crisis in Tienanmen as a challenge. Here we can see that “the Tienanmen Incident reintroduced China into American domestic politics.” Although, as he had not expected that course of action, Bush was totally unprepared to deal with the whole situation, he was under pressure from Congress to act quickly. Bush himself, later in his book A World Transformed, confirmed that he had a problem with how to condemn the massacre ‘appropriately.’ One of the way to punish Chinese Communist leaders was to impose international sanctions. There was much controversy among American politicians about the sanctions themselves: “But even as Americans rejected his [Bush’s] sympathetic approach to Beijing, they divided amongst themselves regarding the proper degree of sanction to place upon such a populous nation growing at such a rapid pace.” No wonder it caused disagreement as China was not a usual country for the U.S. There had to be some reaction as the incident could not pass unnoticed, which could undermine American authority, and the problem was, I guess, how it could be done without ‘affecting’ China too much. Mayers and Shambaugh call the events in the Square “the first major crisis in Sino-American Relations since their normalization in 1979.” As pointed out by Raymond Moore: “Initially, the U.S. criticized Chinese actions, suspended military sales, cut off high level diplomacy, opposed loans to China, warned U.S. tourists to avoid the mainland and extended the visas of 70,000 Chinese students in the U.S.” Lampton adds: “These [the sanctions] included suspension of military-to-military cooperation and policy equipment sales, suspension of military and high-level leadership exchanges, and the recommendation that new international financial agency loans to China be indefinately postponed.”
Later, however, Bush, understanding China’s vital role in overall U.S. policy, decided that “[China] should not be driven back into the hostile isolation of the Korean War period.” Tylor suggests it might be due to the telephone call that he received from Nixon “not to disrupt the relationship.” That is why he decided to “keep the lines of communication open.” As pointed out by Maldwyn A. Jones, Bush’s reaction to those events was much too soon. Bush together with the international community criticized in unison Deng Xiaonping. A couple of days later he tried in vain to make a telephone call to Deng to explain the whole situation and inform him about his good intentions. He was to say that the U.S. could not tolerate such brutal breaking of human rights. In order to let Chinese leaders know about his positive intensions on June 30 1989 Bent Scowcroft went to China. As Lampton suggests, Bush wanted to keep in touch especially with the leaders in Beijing, mostly with Deng Xiaoping. That is why despite the fact that the Congress pressed for stronger sanctions, Bush remained heedless of it. At a press conference he said: “I’ve told you what I’m going to do. I’m president. I set the foreign policy objectives and actions taken by executive branch.” As Michałek suggests, it was just a strategic move on the part of Bush: relations between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and a trade deficit of more than 12 billion dollars. Michel Oksenberg, in her article The China Problem, states that: “China’s leaders have expressed no remorse for their decision to send heavily armed military forces into the capital. No amnesty has been given to activists in that spring’s demonstrations, and many dissidents languish in prisons without charges filed against them.” I think that this behavior placed the Bush administration in a very difficult position as it was hard to think of an excuse for the President, being under pressure, to sustain relations as no remorse meant no regrets on the part of the Chinese regime. What is more, Richard C. Bush states that the tragedy brought “a sharp decline in the American public’s support for a policy of engagement and cooperation with the PRC.” We can say that president Bush was under a lot of pressure not only from the outside, meaning the international arena where all actors are watching, but also from the inside.
Strobe Talbott explains that people in China have been not only unhappy but deeply angry about the situation in their country and, through that, explains the reason for the events. He stresses that “its [CP’s] claims of representation are a tattered veil for its true function of repression.” It is just a matter of time before repressed masses of people cannot stand it and ‘explode.’ In order not to let people explode again in the future, the regime decided to solve the problem the way it did. This is the only rational explanation I can figure out. This is very characteristic of various dictatorships all around the world where constraints are imposed on people and from time to time a massacre is ‘needed’ to, as if, ‘tame’ the population. Talbott makes a comparison of Communism to a military regime in disguise. He says that: “The disguise came off in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland in 1981-and in China last week.” Relating to the students’ protest as a natural form of expression in a democratic world, Talbot says: “It was the massacre on the square, not the demonstration that preceded it, that seemed like an unnatural act.” In his article, he draws a conclusion that we can observe at least the beginning of collapse of Communism. He says “Something is happening in the Communist world, a revolt against the system. From the Baltic to the China Sea, people are straining against the confines of Communism, demanding a greater share in the world’s riches and a fair share in their own governance.” Similarly to Talbott, Steven Hook and John Spanier notice the same trend. They state that: “Events in China during the summer of 1989 served as a prelude to the autumn uprisings in Eastern Europe and suggested that the erosion of communism’s appeal and legitimacy had extended to the world’s most populous communist state.” Today we know that they overestimated, at least a little bit, Tienanmen Squre events as the Communist regime is still present in the country. It is essential to notice, however, that although China is a Communist state, the country is developing at a pretty fast rate, which is unusual itself in comparison to all other Communist states. It is, I suppose, due to cheap labor force and the fact that the country is quite open to international cooperation. This is as if Chinese leaders understood, as opposed to other Communist states, that the only reasonable way to keep such a populous country in good condition is to open up to the world. The size of the state also matters here as it is a partner not to be avoided by others due to the advantages it may bring to them. About those advantages and other things connected to economy I will write in the next paragraph entitled Economy. Generally speaking, although China is a Communist state, it does not share typical characteristic of other Communist countries, where the means of repression are much more severe like in Cuba, where, in addision, there is way less personal freedom.
Kissenger directs our attention to the fact that Deng Xiaoping, the ruler of China at the time of the events and a decade preceding it, called the uprising “an ironic reversal.” He adds that when Deng started his reforms in 1979, thousands of Chinese students were allowed to go to Western univesities. There, Kissinger states, they experienced exposure to values “for which they shed their blood in Tienanmen Square.” We can draw a conclusion here that the students, treating protest as a normal means of expression in democracy, did not consider that the whole situation would lead to a disaster.
To summarize, it is important to remember that after the Tienanmen Square massacre, President Bush still tried to maintain “a minimal level of cooperation,” he, however, could not do that due to congresional and public opinion. To some extent, however, Bush decided to disregard it and “worked to ensure that the basic nature of the relationship was not significantly changed.” The basic nature of the relationship was probably the economy. It is worthy of consideration that the Tienanmen incident was the first true test for the new President. Sanctions imposed on China after the massacre affected Chinese economic condition. Patrick Tyler notices: “After leading the world in economic growth during the 1980s, the Chinese economy had gone keel-up after the Tienanmen crisis. Companies pulled out, expatriates fled, joint ventures collapsed, and capital retreated.”
It is important to notice that there were repercussions of the crisis coming from all over the world and took the form of open critique. The mildest, as Seiichiro Takagi notices, were from China’s Asian neighbors. Xia Xudong and Wang Shuzhong, like many other Chinese observers, state that the sanctions imposed were just an excuse for the disappearance of strategic rationale for peace and harmony between the U.S. and Chinese governments. From this we can read that the U.S. as if wanted to find a pretext to deteriorate the relations. Of course it is common knowledge that such a situation would not be in the best interest of the United States and it would never allow it to happen.
As far as the contemporary situation is concened, Robert Ross notices that today’s quite good relations with China are due to Bush administration and the way it behaved then. He states that: “[...] President Bush had not only managed to restore important elements of U.S.-China cooperation but also established a record of cooperating with post-Tienanmen China while achieving important American interests, thus establishing the precedent for successor administrations to persue U.S.-China cooperation with reduced domestic opposition.” He adds that now, had not the administration behaved the way it did, the relations would be more conflictual. This, as if, paved the way for the Clinton administration for easier cooperation. Bush and Clinton conducted similar policy toward China although the circumstances were different. Clinton adopted the goal of ‘strategic partnership’ but George W. Bush decided not to follow suit and “announced that he would treat China as a ‘strategic competitor.’”
In the newsweek article entitled ‘Robokop’ to the Rescue the author humorously states that in the future we will not see scenes seen in Tienanmen Square again as [s]he writes about Beijing trials for new tactics for controlling protests. The author adds: “Last week Beijing unveiled black high-tech armored uniforms, imported from France at up to $2,700 apiece. The futuristic ‘Robocop’ riot gear provides ‘head-to-toe protection,’ [...] They resist water, flame, ‘even Molotov cocktails.’”
In the subtitles below, I would like to have a closer look how the incident in Tienanmen influenced U.S.-China relations in three major fields- economy, human rights, and national security. Exept for judging the immediate consequences of those 1989 events, as I wrote before, I will have a broader look at the Sino-American cooperation in the three subcategories in the 1990s.
Economy
Kerry Dumbaugh notices that the events in Tienanmen Square had immediate effects on Chinese economy as “[...] China’s crackdown in Tienanmen Square during the first year of Bush administration drove investors away from the China market, eroded business confidence in China’s economic potential, and made it difficult for business groups to defend U.S. relations with China.” Lampton calls the sanctions ‘unilateral.’ He, then, adds that with time the sanctions began to be seen by the Chinese citizens and leaders as attempts to as if weaken the Republic and “Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues repeatedly characterized the sanctions as a knot the Bush administration had tied [...]” That was a very clear sign for the administration to treat the matter seriously and delicately. The sanctions, as I mentioned before, were really ‘nasty’ as “tourism, trade, and investment slumped [...]” The consequences of the loss in tourism “cost China millions of dollars in lost revenues.” It it important to note that in his letter to Deng, Bush excuses himself. He writes that he would like to leave the events in Tienanmen to be judged by historians. He explained that as the president of the U.S.A. he had had to do certain things and added that there were still voices to take even more severe steps. He rejected those demands because, as he said, he did not want to destroy the mutual relations that they both, Bush and Deng, had built with such difficulty. He concluded that he had explained it to the American nation that it was not his intension to unfairly burden the Chinese nation with sanctions. We can see here how hard Bush administration worked to have the relations intact after Tienanmen.
Edward Friedman directs our attention to the importance of international trade for the American economy to grow. China, being a country that is still developing, is an enormous market where the demand for goods is huge. Ernsberger calls the Chinese market “the world’s most dazzling growth market.” Friedman points out that as far as economic relations between Beijing and Washington are concerned, we can talk about a positive core. I think that in a situation where both sides can gain, it is much easier to cooperate successfully, as it is best examplified here. Lafeber points out:
Its [China’s] Communist leaders had built the nation’s economy in the 1980s by
encouraging free-market enterprise. The nation’s annual economic growth rate soared
toward 12 percent. Even Japan’s rate had slowed to about half of China’s. U.S.-Chinese
trade boomed, although China enjoyed a large favorable balance. This growing gap led
U.S. critics to demand that China open itself to more American goods, and that its
Communist leaders allow more democracy and personal expression.

The economic interaction is the cause of disagreement within the U.S. as due to Chinese cheap labor, American businesses are moving factories there depriving workers in America of work. In America, it is due to technological progress and that is why China should not be blamed for that, and it is. Friedman even says that: “China has become a symbol for American anxieties about the pains of the new economy.” On one hand, there is less work for Americans in their country on the other hand, though, the production costs are lower which enables the American companies to produce more, not to mention the fact that the immediate Chinese market is at hand. So, there is no question that such a situation is a great advantage for the American economy as well as for the Chinese economy.
Good economic relations between China and the U.S. can go beyond just earning money based on export and import. Friedman calls it ‘win-win interaction,’ where both parties are to benefit. The most important thing is to make China feel it is the beneficiary of the economic status quo so that any war-prone actions are prevented. Henry Kissinger is of similar opinion stating that: “...modern China has a huge stake in the international economic system- more than the Soviet Union ever had- generating powerful incentives not to challenge the status quo in Asia.” Walter Lord seems to note the same thing by stating that: “Encouragement of China’s active participation in global and regional institutions, which can help tame Chinese impulses toward adventurism through interdependence and self-interest.” This can be done, for instance, by allowing China a seat at the decision-making table in the G-8, or on the Asian currency reserve fund. The most important here is to give China the impression that they have a say in various matters concerning, at least so far, the Asian continent.
Friedman brings to our attention the fact that: “Many independant analysts agree that comprehensive economic engagement facilitates growth in China and that rising standards of living in China enhance the prospects for Chinese democratization, which, in turn, enhances the likelihood for peace in the region.” We can see how economy influences politics, which was also noticed by President George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice who argues for “faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change.” Strobe Talbot states the same by saying that “[...] economic reform and political change are impossible without each other.” It has to be noted that Steven Hook and John Spanier as well provide reasons for the necessity of political change, not only economic one. They conclude that:
Deng [...] opened and greatly expanded the Chinese economy while refusing to consider
meaningful political reforms. [...] Deng’s economic strategy left its communist government
with ample power to prevent ‘counter-revolution.’ The implications were clear: whereas
effective economic reforms could improve living conditions in the absence of democratic
rule, political reforms combined with economic stagnation invited popular backlash and
jeopardized the state’s very existence.

We can conclude that as if it was in the best interest of everyone to keep China in a good condition for overall safety and stability in the area. The U.S., being the world’s hegemon, has a special role to play and bears accountability for any failures. The importance of ‘healthy’ economic ralations is highlighted by all the prominent politicians in the U.S.A. In 2000 presidential campaign, both candidates stressed the value of economic engagement. It is also important to note that American economy, being in a very good condition in the 1990s played a crucial role here. Friedman writes that: “Nonetheless, the 1990s American rise is a two-edged sword: it not only makes America admirable but also makes it the hated obstacle to China’s rise to predominance in Asia” I suppose that the whole situation only intensified negative feelings and strengthened negative attitude of the Chinese towards the Americans. It is obvious that the Chinese may fear any American ‘interventions’ in the future and may get the impression that their position in Asia is precarious.
Terry McCarthy in his article makes a comparison between Russian and Chinese economy. He mentions economic reforms in China initiated by Xiaoping in 1979 when farmers’ markets were legalized and “as a result, China’s agricultural sector is far more productive than Russia’s.” To conclude here, we can say that China is a more important economic partner for the U.S.A than Russia.

Human Rights
Apart from economy, the question of human rights is also a matter of concern in dealings between the two countries. Starting from the mid-1970s, the issue of human rights has been underscored in American life in the United States and “quickly became the dominant theme of America’s relations with China.” The end of the Cold War was marked by the springing up of new democracies around the world like Thailand, the Philipines, and Indonesia. The Communist rulers in Beijing perceived those events as a major threat to their rulership. They imagined a new Cold War led by the U.S. this time, however, against China. They set a new goal- ‘to knock America off its high perch.’ Any American attempts to promote democratic forces were seen as efforts to “foster a Chinese eqivalent of Poland’s Solidarity movement in order to undermine the Communist system.” Lampton suggests that after the tragedy in the Square “American popular attitude toward the PRC changed overnight-from 72 percent ‘favorable’ in February 1989 to 58 percent ‘unfavorable’ six months later.” No wonder such was the reaction of the public as the Tienanmen Incident happened “in the full glare of the television cameras.” The author then adds: “That seared a negative image of China firmly into the minds of most Americans. An American distaste for a politically incorrect China, American disillusionment with a China that it probably had had illusions about, really dominated the relationship.” With such a situation at home American politicians were forced to touch upon the issue of human rights having been broken in China. In a situation where presidential elections were closing in, it was a really hot issue. For the time being, “With the massacre at Tienanmen Square in 1989, human rights temporarily crowded out all other considerations.” Bush reminds that they were the first to in introduce sanctions encouraging its allies to do the same and admits that they were fighting for the right cause, meaning defending human rights.
In his presidential campaign in 1992, Clinton, bearing in mind the Tienanmen Square events, promised not to “coddle the major human rights violator,” being the Chinese regime, calling them “the butchers of Beijing.” We can see that his campaigning rhetoric was pretty offensive towards the Chinese leaders. The Communist Party (CP) dictatorship was not much worried by those accusations and Clinton had two options to choose from: to conduct normal trade with China, or to stop it pressing the violations of human rights, which otherwise would have a detrimental effect on American economy, being then in a stage of recovery. Little did he realize then that very soon he would have to change his approach. As soon as Clinton won the elections, he realized the value of good economic relations with China, he skipped the issue of human rights immediately. Had he not done it, it would have been imossible to keep ‘normal’ relations with China. As Lampton suggests it was “extremely difficult for him [Clinton] to work with them for some time after he was elected.” Hook and Spanier noticed that “[...] Clinton backed down on his political demands and announced in 1994 that human rights no longer would be linked directly to China’s MFN status.” Although after the massacre the U.S. frequently criticized systematic violations of human rights, this issue had to be abandoned due to good economic relations.
Friedman states that there were some other reasons for the U.S. decision not to focus attention on Chinese violations of human rights. He says that: “Should America, the lone eagle, unnecessarily irritate China on human rights matters, thereby strengthening hard-line militarists in China, Asian neighbors would blame America.” I think that America cannot afford such a situation where its Asian allies turn on them in such a huge and important region of the world. The allies there were necessary in case of any military conflict that could arise in this unstable area. Seeing that stressing the human rights movement in China was pointless and in vain, and might be damaging, the Clinton administration decided to skip it. As Friedman points out: “However, it [the Clinton administration] tried to work quietly to get leading prisoners of conscience released from Chinese prisons, and a number of them were.” I think that this move was only propaganda to quiet down voices of those political enemies in the country that would claim that the issue was completely disregarded by the administration. It is worth considering that the activism of international human rights movement was not treated in China seriously and it was perceived to be anti-China movement.
What is more, it is important to remember that the rulers in Beijing did not feel obligation to obey the human rights agenda as they had the impression that USA did not either. As Friedman points out: “They [CP] noted that the US Congress has refused to ratify a number of human rights covenants that even China has signed.” Besides, the Chinese, with support of some other nations like Iran, Burma, and North Korea, tried to explain that the most important thing for them was to end the poverty for over a billion of its population and that was why growth had to be put on the first place. They made a distinction between Asian values- collective good, and Western values, being liberal individualism. This was as if they wanted to show rationality behind their actions and reasons explaining the lack of concern about human rights, at least, at this stage of China’s development. Lord points out that: “They [Chinese leaders] echo the charge that advocating democracy and human rights amounts to inflicting America’s arrogant alien values.”
According to Friedman, in American dealings with China on the issue of human rights there are visable constraints of American power. He states that: “Of most significance, China’s success in beating back efforts of the international human rights community to investigate, judge, and ameliorate pervasive human rights abuses in China reveals the limits on U.S. power even in the post-Cold War era, when America is often expected to solve all problems everywhere.” This question, I suppose, was one of the reasons, except for economic ones, for as if “neglecting” the issue of human rights on the part of the United States, which did not want to show its weaknesses and indicate that it could not do much in this field.
Lampton concludes that: “A review of this period [1989-2000] leads me to conclude that the effective management of Sino-American ties and individual rights progress in China are best promoted when human rights is not the first agenda item and when U.S. interaction with China focuses on long-term development.” It is good that both presidents knew that. On June 27 1998, however, at a press conference Clinton said: “I believe and the American people believe that the use of force and the tragic loss of life [at Tienanmen] was wrong.” We can see that even after many years the question of the Tienanmen massacre is still present in American political rhetoric- I just wonder what the reason for it is, whether it is propaganda or now it is easier to speak out on the issue with less possibility of negative consequences from the Chinese side.
It has to be noted that violations of human rights in China are really quite a problem. Platt and Liu direct our attention to the fact that “Prisoners can be sentenced for up to three years without trial.” They also point to various labor camps where about 230,000 people are kept. What is crucial to notice, as they say, is the fact that China is on the way to improve the situation. They say that the abolition of labor camps is considered “in favor of community service and other forms of punishment that do not amount to complete deprivation of an individual’s freedom.” This is a high-priority issue on China’s list of issues-to-deal-with but the changes are going to be gradual. I think that China wants to change its image and as soon as possible to forget about Tienanmen to attract more inverstors. There is still, however, a lot to be done, e. g. The protection of copy rights, etc that still keeps many international companies away from building their major premises and headquarters there.
Winston Lord notices that in order to improve relations with China in the long run some parameters of national debate in America should be changed. He adds: “Too often that debate dissolves to trade versus human rights, money versus morality. America should advocate both our economic interests and our democratic values. Each augments the other. Both benefit our two peoples.”

National Security
Friedman points out, however, that it is not the question of human rights or economy that plays the major role in the U.S.-China relations. He states it is national security that is priority number one. China was very frequently accused of proliferating the weapons of mass destruction to states considered by Washington as ‘threats to the peace’ , like Pakistan or Libya. The second accusation is that of trying to obtain predominance in Asia by the military build-up, especially of the navy. Kissinger states that: “It [China] is the state with the greatest potential to become rival of the United States at some point in the new century.” He quickly adds, though, that it is not likely to happen in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The friends and allies of the U.S.A. feel threatened and due to the fact, the whole peace in the Asia-Pacific region is intimidated. In Japan, by the year 2000, 30% of the population feared China would start a war. As far as this matter is concerned, Kissinger makes a comparison between China and the Soviet Union. Whereas in Europe the Soviet Union could impose its will on its weak neighbors without problems, in Asia, however, the situation was totally different as China’s neighbors were pretty powerful countries, like the two Koreas, India, Japan, Vietnam, and Russia, and “this imposes on China a diplomacy that does not threaten all its neighbors simultaneously.” That is a huge advantage on the side of the United States. I will devote more space to China’s ambitions of predominance and the fear it evokes in its neighbors a little later in this paper. It is worth pointing out that the island of Taiwan and its autonomy and democracy can feel even more endangered. The question of Taiwan will be touched upon in the last paragraph of my paper.
There are, however, some other obstacles encountered by Americans on the way to satisfactory relations with China. Friedman points out that it is hard to keep good relations with China because:
Since the bloody crushing of China’s nationwide democracy movement in 1989, China’s
CP has barraged its people incessantly with vicious anti-American propaganda, so that
most politically conscious Chinese became persuaded that the United States intends to
keep China down, foster seperation for Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims, and hurt
the Chinese economy and spread chaos in China. America is believed to be anti-China
despite China’s rise being premised on earnings from huge exports to America and cheap
capital from the World Bank, in which America is the major player.

During his visit to Beijing in July 2000, William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense, in his speech to the audience at National Defense University expressed his worry over the fact that American policy is misconstrued due to political propaganda inside China. I think that what American diplomats are most interested in now is how to persuade the Chinese people of Americans’ good intentions, which is impeded by well-thought-out and planned propaganda by the Communist regime. Friedman states that although the Chinese military cannot be compared to the American military, it is extremely powerful in its region. He also brings the growing Chinese economic power and wealth to our attention, which is “funding and fueling military chauvinism and ambitions of regional predominance” and gives the impression of China being a challenge in the 21st century.
Friedman underscores the importance that the U.S. should not act unilaterally “as a lone eagle” but should stick to the allies in the region. Winston Lord states that keeping good relations with Chinese neighbors is a crucial issue. He adds: “That will also act as a hedge against Chinese behavior.” Kissinger agrees with with such course of action stating that America should create “an alliance of Asian states to help America share the burden for the defense of Asia and to contain China.” Friedman suggests that: “Washington therefore should continue a patient and complex policy of comprehensive engagement with China along with quiet vigilance in the region. ” Kissinger states that Chinese leaders are not willing to provoke the United States to risk confrontation with the greatest military power in the world, at least, “at this stage of China’s evolution.” Richard Bush, however, writes that there is a possibility that the U.S. may use military force as a last resort. Kissinger also provides another reason for China wanting to avoid any military confrontation, which is “Conflict with the United States would free all the countries around the vast Chinese periphery to persue their various ambitions and claims.” He brings, however, to our attention the fact that: “If China remains domestically cohesive, it is destined to become a major power and, as such, will have an enhanced capacity to challenge the United States.” He also points to some other nations of similar characteristics, like India, Brazil, and Russia. China, however, stands out of this group of nations as it is developing at a very fast rate and such danger may happen in no time. Generally speaking, China is not inclined, at least for the time being, to engage militarily an any conflicts but, as suggested, such circumstances may sooner or later come.
In the field of national security, what the U.S. had always been most afraid of was the possibility of China getting too close to the Soviet Union. In the times of the Cold War, the U.S. was conducting , as Kissinger calls it, the triangular policy, the relationship between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Kissinger adds:
The challenge for the United States was to make sure that it always had more options than
either of the other two parties within the triangle. This oblidged the United States to stay
closer to both Moscow and Beijing than they were to each other, with a tilt toward Beijing
since it was the Soviet Union which represented the more immediate and by far the more
powerful threat.

Right after the end of the Cold War in 1989, a China-Russia strategic partnership was set and China was buying high technology weapons from Russia to prevent the U.S. from confronting China. Gail Lapidus states that China uses Russia to balance against America as it used America to balance against Russia, in the late Mao era. She also points out that since 1991, China has treated the U.S. as the major Cold War adversary. The bare fact of buying weaponry does not mean that the two countries are friends, as suggested by Platt and Liu. They say that: “The countries have long been strategic rivals and share lots of historical baggage.” As one of the Foreign Defense attache says, they cite, “There’s not a lot of trust between the two. Much of this is a hard-nosed business relationship- a marriage of convenience.” By purchasing weapons system from Russia, China wants to obtain the ambition of predominating in Asia, “which is perceived as a rightful restoration of Chinese greatness.” Not long after the Tienanmen Square massacre, Bush and his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, were prepared to go to China. As Lampton says: “Their motives included the desire to solidify relations with Beijing before Mikhail Gorbachev traveled there later in the year.” He also adds that this situation, which is the feeling of anxiety about China and Soviet Union getting closer to each other. Kukułka points out that after the Tienanmen massacre, the dynamics in Sino-Soviet relations were not weakened. As for Sino-American relations it was, as I wrote before, just the opposite. It was a great opportunity to use for the Soviets to draw another ‘comfortable ally,’ meaning uncomfortable for the U.S. Lampton calls it “disadvantageous Sino-Soviet cooperation.” That can explain, as he elaborates, the careful behavior of Bush administration after the Tienanmen Square massacre. One of Bush’s greatest achievements in foreign policy is improving the relations with China after the Incident in the Square. It has to be noted that this issue could have been easily mishandled and the consequences of such mishandling could be observable even today.
When Clinton came to power, he as well had to deal with the issue of China’s rapid buildup of the military to the level of a ‘regional power.’ What is more, the whole situation and the fact that China was buying missles and advanced fighter planes from Russia irritated not only the United States but also China’s neighbors such as Taiwan, South Korea or Indonesia. As suggested by Platt and Liu, “[...] Russian arms makers and the Chinese military have lately developed a cozy relationship-one built on mutual need. The Russians badly need export earnings, while the Chinese need modern weapons-[...].” There is, however, according to Platt and Liu, “a good deal of unease in the Russian army about selling weapons to China. Both sides realize that, one day, the two countries could find themselves on a competitive trajectory once again.”
Another key issue as far as national security ic concerned is that of China being the
major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction in Asia. As pointed out by Kissinger, this issue is the biggest obstacle on the way toward a stable and cooperative relationship between the two countries. He states that: “Cooperative relations are not a favor either country bestows on the other. They are in the common interest of both.” Kissinger says that it is important to keep a “permanent dialogue on such issues...[that] could test the prospects of a stable relationship.” So far, Pakistan has been provided with Chinese weapons to balance India being more and more dependant on the U.S.A., treated as the main China’s enemy. According to Friedman, in the 21st century this situation is to change due to China’s alteration in security environment. He gives two reasons for it: the first being the fact that China is the largest oil importer and that is why it needs “secure access to the energy resources of a peaceful West Asia” and the second- China does not want war to occur between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons states, on Chinese southwest frontier, as the war would make foreign forces to come to the Chinese borders, which are full of angry minorities. Observing Chinese naval buildup, its Asian neighbors want American military presence in the region “as a guarantor of security [and] stability.” Kissinger states that “Chinese public statements often criticize American military alliances in Asia, giving credence to the view that China’s long-term objective is to undermine the American role and presence in the region.” As Friedman points out it is essential for the U.S. to act according to the will of its Asian allies like Japan or Singapore, which is not to treat China as an enemy to be contained but rather be involved in economic integration and global engagement. He adds that if America acted in opposition to the will, it would be left alone and isolated and, what is more, accused of Chinese bullying, which is the Asian perception of complicating active cooperation with America. Henry Kissinger directs our attention to the fact that it is not the issue of global hegemony that can lead China to confrontation with the United States. Taiwan may be the trigger, he says.

Taiwan
I decided to devote some time to the question of Taiwan in my paper. It is so because I think that the Taiwan issue is an important one in U.S.-China relations, especially for the future of the relations.
In 1943 President Franklin Roosevelt declared Taiwan to be a part of China but when in 1949 the Communists took over on the mainland, Chiang Kai-sheck escaped to Taiwan and established there his Nationalist government, “which claimed to represent all of China.” This government was recognized by the United States as well. Since the 1970s, however, all American presidents have recognized “one-China” policy and rejected “one-China, one-Taiwan” policy (or “two-China” policy). In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed Taiwan Relations Act according to which military intervention is possible if Taiwan is attacked. Here, the U.S. showed its new role as the protector of Taiwanese interests, a very clear sign toward China. It is important to remember that China took a stand on the question of Taiwan claiming that it was not going to use force unless Taiwan formally declared itself independent.
Kissinger pays attention to the fact that: “If the United States chips away at the ‘one-China’ principle, first affirmed by Roosevelt in 1943 and reiterated by all six American presidents since Nixon, a military confrontation is probable.” He adds that “the United States possesses diplomatic, economic, and military advantages allowing it to shape the future without resorting to preemptive confrontation with China.” He notices, however, that all the participants in the debate over Taiwan are not interested in “driving matters to the point of combustion.” Richard Bush seems to notice the same trend by stating that both Bush and Clinton administrations “[has] insisted that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved peacefully.” He adds that in the relations with China, Bush administration had to first deal with PRC’s negative image after the Tienanmen and his policy towards Taiwan was pretty much the same as Reagan’s. He points out, however, that in Congress the image of Taiwan turned for the better then. He adds that the issue of Taiwan “was not high on the agenda” of both of the administrations.
Although, there is a lot of domestic pressure in America to give up the “one-China” policy, the U.S. will have to stick to this, for the time being. What is more, Chinese statement about its rejection of any American proposition of intervention in the future of Taiwan makes it clear what China’s attitude toward this issue is. We can see that the question of Taiwan is a very delicate and fragile one for the Chinese regime, and it is going to be one of the challenges for American diplomacy in the twenty-first century.
To conclude, as we can see, U.S.-China relations are a complex issue, I would be even inclined to say complexed. If we were to put the question in great generalization, it is all about a ‘fight’ between the ‘eagle and the ‘dragon’ about their position in Asia, an important strategic region. It seems to me that China has more right to predominate in Asia than the U.S. There is, however, one problem with China- it is a Communist state and due to the fact the situation where a communist state is simultaneously a predominant one in any region is unacceptable for the United States and, I suppose, for overall safety. The reason for that is simple- to American mind, a powerful communist nation will try to expand the system into other countries endangering their sovereignty and causing regional conflicts, which, later, may extend to other parts. I strongly support that argument. We can also see that in its relations with China, the United States is a very careful player, even more careful than China. American have tried to keep China as far from the Soviet Union, later Russia, as possible. It is so due to both China’s power, militarily and in population, and market capacity. If the Soviet Union and China joined forces, it would be an enemy the United States, if alone, could not overpower. I think that the development of future relations between the two countries is a very interesting matter to observe for the time being, with China being treated quite seriously by a greater number of countries and trying to be even more open. What is so specific about China is the fact that it is so much different from other Communist states, like for example North Korea or Cuba. If not before, China is now growing to understand the importance of having good relations with other countries and what it can gain, due to the fact, the Tienanmem protests would be solved in a much more ‘civilized,’ meaning here democratic’ way now.

























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author: Bartosz M. Kraszewski

American Studies Center, University of Warsaw